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Abstract
The competence of the European Union in the field of labour law is limited to the support, comple-
mentation and coordination of the activities of the Member States in the exhaustive areas of labour 
law. The diversity of national definition of legal concepts used in EU challenges the harmonisation 
of national legal orders and their gradual convergence. The lack of consistency between Member 
States in respect of determination of who qualifies as a “worker” in national legal orders lead to 
the differences between Member States, as regards the application of the minimum standards to 
the same category of persons performing a paid job. This can undermine the objectives pursued 
by directives and may jeopardise their effectiveness. A uniform concept of “worker” has not yet 
been developed at the EU level. The starting point for any discussion about the concept of “worker” 
in EU law is the definition of “worker” provided for the principle of free movement of workers 
enshrined in Art. 45 of TFEU. Given the non-discriminatory purpose of the concept of worker 
under the principle of free movement of workers, this article is going to consider whether this 
concept has the potential for broader protection of workers in the EU.
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1. Introduction
The competence of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as: “EU”) in the field of 
labour law involves the support, complementation and coordination the activities of the 
Member States in the exhaustive areas of labour law (Art. 153 and 156 of Treaty on the 
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Functioning of the European Union; OJ C 2010/83, hereinafter referred to as: “TFEU,” 
p. 1). This entails, as Art. 153(2)(b) of TFEU states, the adoption by means of a direc-
tive of the minimum standards to be implemented by Member States. The harmonisa-
tion of national legal orders and their gradual convergence challenged the diversity of 
national definitions of legal concepts used in EU labour law legislation. The concept of 
a “worker” serves as a good example of this issue, when it sets out the personal scope 
of EU labour law legislation. The lack of consistency between Member States in respect 
of determination of who qualifies as a “worker” in national legal orders leads to the dif-
ferences between Member States as regards the application of the minimum standards 
to the same category of persons performing a paid job. This can undermine the objec-
tives pursued by directives and may jeopardise their effectiveness.
A uniform concept of “worker” has not yet been developed at the EU level. The 
starting point for any discussion about the concept of “worker” in EU law is the defi-
nition of “worker” provided for the principle of free movement of workers enshrined 
in Art. 45 of TFEU, which is one of the four pillars of the European single market. The 
concept of “worker” is at the very heart of the principle free movement of workers, 
since the creation of a genuine common market without internal frontiers needs to 
ensure that each Member State guarantees that nationals of other Member States re-
ceive the same treatment as that guaranteed to its own nationals as regards access to 
its labour market (Art. 45(2) of TFEU; CJEU cases: Hoekstra, C-75/63, EU:C:1964:19; 
Levin, C-53/81, EU:C:1982:105, p. 7). The development of a single definition of “work-
er” for the purpose of free movement of workers is based on the assumption that if the 
definition of this term were a matter within the competence of national law of Mem-
ber States, it would then be possible for each Member State to unilaterally modify the 
meaning of the concept of “worker” and to frustrate at will the protection afforded by 
the principle of free movement of workers to certain categories of person (CJEU cas-
es: Hoekstra; Levin, p. 11). The concept of “worker” under Art. 45 of TFEU has an au-
tonomous meaning, which means that this concept may not be defined by reference to 
the national laws of the Member States, which cannot interpret this concept differently 
when implementing the principle of free movement of workers (CJEU case: Lawrie-
Blum, C-66/85, EU:C:1986:284).
Given the non-discriminatory purpose of the concept of worker under the princi-
ple of free movement of workers, it is then worth considering whether this concept has 
the potential for broader protection of workers in the EU.
2. The concept of “worker”—a supranational meaning
Art. 45 does not provide a definition of the concept of “worker.” It also cannot be found 
in Regulation No 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union.
The concept of “worker” for the purpose of free movement of workers was developed 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as: “CJEU”). It 
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is based on the so-called Lawrie-Blum formula, adopted by the CJUE in the Lawrie-
Blum case (Lawrie-Blum, p. 15). Under this formula, the concept of “worker” is deter-
mined by the “existence of a relationship of subordination vis-á-vis the employer, ir-
respective of the nature of that relationship, the actual provision of services and the 
payment of remuneration.” Under this formula, any person who “is obliged to provide 
services to another in return for monetary reward and who is subject to the discretion 
or control of the another person as regards the way in which the work is done” (Lawrie-
Blum, p. 14) must be regarded as a “worker.” In the earlier case Levin (p. 17), the CJEU 
stated that this covers only “effective and genuine activities, to the exclusion of activi-
ties on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary.” The EU 
concept of “worker” is defined by the reference to the objective criteria “distinguished 
by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned” (Lawrie-Blum, p. 17), 
namely the reality of the relationship rather than the formal terms of the contract. The 
concept of “worker” developed in Lawrie-Blum and Levin was upheld in later caselaw 
(among others see in particular cases: Martinez Sala, C-85/96, EU:C:1998:217; Col-
lins, C-138/02, EU:C:2004:172, p. 26; Trojani, C-456/02, EU:C:2004:488, p. 15; Neidel, 
C-337/10, EU:C:2012:263, p. 23; SARL, C-432/14, EU:C:2015:643, p. 22).
The definition of “worker” developed for the purpose of free movement of workers 
is shaped by the “traditional” defining structural elements of the employment relation-
ship, which are: subordination, bilaterality and continuity. These elements set out the 
borderline for a binary division between an employment relationship and other work 
relations. Notably, the concept of “worker” under Art. 45 of TFEU does not cover the 
situation where a person is not in a relation of subordination, meaning as a “personal 
dependency,” but only in a form of “economic dependency,” since it works in person for 
only one of a very small number of contractual partners (Risak, Dullinger 2018, p. 46). 
Such workers are considered by the CJEU to be self-employed, thus enjoy an autono-
mous free movement right to establishment (Art. 49 of TFEU) and freedom to provide 
services (Art. 56 of TFEU; also: Allonby, C-256/01, EU:C:2004:18, p. 68; FNV Kunsten, 
C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2411, pp. 35, 36, 38).
The CJEU represents an inclusive approach to these defining structural elements 
of the employment relationship, since a restrictive interpretation is considered to 
be contrary to the assumptions underlying the principle of free movement of work-
ers (among others see in particular cases: Levin, p. 12, 13, 15; Lawrie-Blum, p. 16; 
Bettray, C-344/87, EU:C:1989:226, p. 11; Raulin, C-357/89, EU:C:1992:87, p. 10; Mee-
usen, C-337/97, EU:C:1999:284; Ninni-Orasche, C-413/01, EU:C:2003:600, p. 23). 
These elements are interpreted on a case-by-case basis considering of all factors and 
circumstances characterising the relationship between the parties (see in particular 
cases: Danosa, C-232/09, EU:C:2010:674, p. 46; Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV and 
Others vs. F.L.F. Spies von Büllesheim, C-47/14, EU:C:2015:574, p. 46; Allonby, p. 69). 
A broad approach to the concept of “worker” seeks to confront the challenges to regu-
lation of a growing number of working relationships that do not fall within the bound-
aries of the employment relationship set out by a strict understanding of the concept 
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of “subordination” and “continuity,” mainly those characterised by an irregular income, 
on-call schedules, involve fragmented working hours, or are provided on a casual basis. 
This is in line with the preamble to Regulation No 492/2011, which contains a general 
affirmation of the right of free movement of all workers in Member States, irrespective 
of whether they are permanent, seasonal or frontier workers or whether they pursue 
their activities for the purpose of providing services, and recently established a Euro-
pean Pillar of Social Rights that extends the principle enshrined to all workers regard-
less of the type and duration of their employment relationship (see: Recital 15 Commis-
sion Recommendation 16 April 2017 on the European Pillar of Social Rights, Brussels, 
26 April 2017, C(2017)2600 final).
Whereas the CJEU uses a “traditional” indicia for determining a “subordination,” 
meaning a manifestation of the direction of the employer over the worker (among oth-
ers see, in particular cases: Lowrie-Blum, §§ 17, 18; Allonby, § 72; Danosa, § 46; Becu, 
C-22/98, EU:C:1999:419, p. 26), a clear tendency in caselaw for a broader understanding 
of this concept is visible, from strict and hierarchical, regarding the time, place and the 
way the task is carried out by an employee (among others see in particular cases: Lowrie-
Blum, pp. 17, 18; Allonby, p. 72; Danosa, p. 46; Becu, p. 26), to a more flexible one. In 
the O’Brien case (C-393/10, EU:C:2012:110, pp. 34, 35, 38, 51; see also: Ruhrlandklinik 
gGmbH, C-216/1,5 EU:C:2016:883), the CJEU has made allowances for greater auton-
omy and independence of the employee as to the organisation of work and the way the 
tasks are performed. The “continuity” as an element of the concept of “worker” is mani-
fested as an exclusionary criterion that requires that the activity is not “purely marginal” 
and “ancillary.” The CJEU confirms that qualitative and quantitative national criteria 
that refer to the qualifying period of employment, amount of income derived from, or 
number of hours of work, are not decisive when deciding about the status of a “worker.” 
The recent caselaw of the CJEU provides some guidelines that may be useful for such 
an interpretation, in which the CJEU analysed the extent of the activity concerned. The 
CJEU held that it cannot, in itself, qualify work as “marginal” and “ancillary,” thus ex-
cluding a person concerned from the status of “worker:” short duration of employment, 
fixed from the outset (Ninni-Orasche, p. 25; Raulin, p. 11) or provided on the basis of 
a framework of “work on demand” (Wippel, C-313/02, EU:C:2004:607, p. 40); a limited 
number of hours of work (Lawrie-Blum, p. 20; Genc, C-14/09, EU:C:2010:57, p. 26), in-
cluding that provided in the framework of an on-call contract (Raulin, p. 11, 14); a lim-
ited amount of remuneration, including remuneration lower than the starting salary 
in a given profession (Lawrie-Blum, p. 20), and lower than the minimum guaranteed 
remuneration in a Member State or lower than what is considered to be a minimum 
in Member States required for subsistence, irrespective of whether such an income is 
supplemented with other income of a worker (Levin; Fenoll, C-316/13, EU:C:2015:200; 
Genc, p. 25) or when a remuneration is largely provided by subsidies from public funds 
(Bettray, p. 15); the lower productivity of a person employed in the scheme of social em-
ployment (Bettray, p. 15); or work in return for payment in kind (Steymann, C-196/87, 
EU:C:1988:475; Payir, C-294/06, EU:C:2008:36).
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The application of the concept of “worker” to EU primary and secondary law
In the case Martinez Sala (p. 31), the CJEU pointed out that the definition of worker 
in EU law “varies according to the area in which the definition is to be applied.” In the 
Navas case (C-13/05, EU:C:2006:184, p. 41; see also: Meerts, C-116/08, EU:C:2009:645, 
p. 41), the CJEU has expressed its desire for uniform application of EU law, which re-
quires the need to given “an autonomous and uniform interpretation” of a provision of 
EU law, which makes no express reference to the law of Member States, “having regard 
to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question.” 
This confirms that when defining the concept of a “worker,” the ratio legis of the rel-
evant provisions of EU primary and secondary legislation must be taken into account.
The contextual and teleological interpretation was applied by the CJEU in the case 
of Allonby (p. 64) when determining the term “worker” used in Art. 157 of TFEU 
(ex Art. 141 of EC). The decision in Allonby was built around the observations made by 
the CJEU in the case of Angonese (C-281/98, EU:C:2000:296, p. 35), where it pointed 
out that Art. 48 of TFEU (also Art. 45) “lays down a fundamental freedom and which 
constitutes a specific application of the general prohibition of discrimination,” there-
fore “like Art. 119 EC (Art. 157 of TFEU) it is designed to ensure that there is no dis-
crimination on the labour market.” The CJEU then found that the definition of “worker” 
developed for the purpose of free movement of workers needs to be imported in the 
area of equal pay for men and women as contained in Art. 157 of TFEU (Allonby, § 67; 
Tomaszewska 2011, pp. 285–288). Given that Art. of 157 of TFEU constitutes a spe-
cific expression of the general principle of equality and non-discrimination, it is clear 
that the concept of “worker” under Art. 45 of TFEU has the potential to determine the 
scope ratione personae of the general principle of discrimination as regards to other 
“conditions of employment.” The same rationale, as indicated by the CJEU in the Allon-
by case, apply to the personal scope of anti-discrimination secondary law, in particu-
lar Directive 2006/54/EC, Directive 2000/78/EC and Directive 2000/43/EC, that share 
with Art. 157 of TFEU the common trait of being adopted to put into effect a general 
principle of equal treatment (Tomaszewska 2011, pp. 289–291).
The argument of “uniform application” of EU law, as indicated in the Navas case, 
lies behind the reasoning for claiming an autonomous concept of “worker” developed 
for the purpose of free movement of workers, in a few socially-oriented directives that 
do not include an explicit definition of “worker” and do not refer to the nationally ac-
cepted definition of this concept. As follows from the CJEU decision in the Kiiski case 
(C-116/06, EU:C:2007:536, pp. 24, 25), the concept of “pregnant worker” in Directive 
92/85/EEC (Maternity Protection Directive) has a “Community meaning, even if, in 
respect of one element of that definition, namely that relating to the method of com-
munication of her condition to her employer, it refers back to national legislation and/
or national practice” (on the same jurisprudential line see also: Danosa, p. 39). In the 
case Union syndicale Solidaires Isére (C-428/09, EU:C:2010:612, p. 28) “an autonomous 
meaning” of the concept of “worker specific to European Union law” was given by the 
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CJEU for the purpose of applying Directive 2003/88/EC (Working Time Directive; this 
jurisprudential line was upheld in later case-law, e.g. Fenoll, pp. 25, 27). The same au-
tonomous concept of “worker” was also embraced in the context of Directive 98/59/
EC (Collective Redundancy Directive; Commission vs. Italy, C-596/12, EU:C:2014:77, 
pp. 16, 17) and in Directive 2008/95/EC (Employer Insolvency Directive; Balkaya, 
C-229/14, EU:C:2015:455, p. 34). With respect to these Directives, which share a com-
mon aim to achieve harmonisation of national rules in a given area, the autonomous 
concept for the personal scope of its application serves to ensure comparable protection 
for worker’s rights in different Member States (see the reasoning used by CJEU in case 
Balkaya, § 32 as a presumption for an argument for an autonomous concept of “work-
er”). Attempts to provide a codified definition of “worker” for the purposes of the pro-
posed Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, which would be 
based on the established caselaw of the CJEU, as developed since Lawrie-Blum, has so 
far failed to reach a solution (more on this issue see: Bednarowicz 2019, pp. 604–623).
3. The EU’s autonomous concept of “worker” vs. nationally 
accepted definitions
The personal scope of most of the Directives is shaped by reference to the nationally 
accepted definition of “worker,” by stating that they cover those “who have an employ-
ment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements 
and/or practice in force in each Member State.” This is the case of Directive 2001/23/
EC (Transfer of Undertakings Directive; Art. 2(1)(d)), Directive 2010/18/EU (Parental 
Leave Directive; Clause 1(2)), Directive 2008/104/EC (Temporary Agency Work Di-
rective; 3(1)(a)(c)), Directive 97/81/EC (Part-Time Work Directive Clause 2(1)) and 
Directive 99/70/EC (Fixed-Term Work Directive Clause 2(1)).
Initially, in applying all these Directives, the CJEU refused to confirm an autono-
mous concept of “worker.” In the well-known of case Danmols Inventar (C-105/84, 
EU:C:1985:331, pp. 26, 27), it held that, while the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 
“is intended to achieve only partial harmonisation .  .  . it is not intended to establish 
a uniform level of protection throughout the Community on the basis of common cri-
teria,” then that Directive:
. . . may be relied upon only by persons who are, in one way or another, protected as employees under 
the law of the Member State concerned. If they are so protected, the Directive ensures that their 
rights arising from a contract of employment or an employment relationship are not diminished 
as a result of the transfer.
The CJEU relied on an argument of “partial harmonisation” in later cases—Collino and 
Chiappero (C-343/98, EU:C:2000:441, pp. 36, 37) and Scattolon (C-108/10, EU:C:2011:542, 
p. 39). The position adopted in the case of Danmols Inventar was re-affirmed by the 
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CJEU in the case of Wippel (p. 40) with respect to the application of the Part-Time 
Work Directive (respectively other so-called atypical work Directives), that is seeking to 
achieve a partial harmonisation in respect of working conditions. The CJEU confirmed 
the absolute power of the Member State to define the concept of “workers who have an 
employment contract or an employment relationship” under the Part-Time Work Di-
rective. This meant, in practice, the exclusion of certain a category of atypical work from 
the protection provided by atypical directives dependant on the national legal defini-
tions and practices and led to differences in the protection between Member States.
The O’Brien case (pp. 34, 35, 38, 51) demonstrates a clear departure from the approach 
in Danmols Inventar. The CJEU has held that the discretion granted to the Member States 
in respect of the definition of “worker” is not unlimited. “In that regard, Member States 
may not apply rules which are liable to jeopardise the achievement of the objectives 
pursued by a directive and, therefore, deprive it of its effectiveness.” Accordingly that:
. . . the definition of “workers who have an employment contract or an employment relationship” for 
the purposes of Clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-time work will have an effect on 
the scope and effectiveness of the principle of equal treatment enshrined in that agreement.
For this reason, the power of Member States to define the concept of “worker” may not 
lead to arbitrary exclusion of certain categories of persons from the protection offered 
by Directive 97/81and that framework agreement that is possible only if the relationship 
concerned, “by its nature, is substantially different from that between employers and 
their employees falling, according to national law, under the category of workers.” The 
argument of “effet utile” of EU law was applied by the CJEU in the recent case of Ruhr-
landklinik gGmbH (pp. 29, 36) with regard to the Temporary Agency Workers Directive. 
The evolution in the CJEU caselaw in the approach to the ratione personae of Directives 
that refer to a nationally accepted definition of “worker” has been recently literally affirmed 
in a Directive on Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers (Art. 2) and in a proposal for 
a Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the European Union 
(Art. 1(2); that will repeal the Written Statement Directive 91/533/EC), that both refer to 
national law, but “with consideration” of the case law of the CJEU. This reflects that the 
intention of the EU legislator is not to replace national legislation in respect of the defini-
tion of a “worker,” but to ensure the effectiveness of EU law (“effet utile” argumentation).
4. Conclusions
This article enabled us to draw some general conclusions regarding the application of 
the autonomous concept of “worker” developed in the EU for the purpose of the prin-
ciple of free movement of workers.
Firstly, we may observe a clear tendency for adopting a uniform concept of “worker” in 
relation to other areas of EU labour law, which is based on the definition of a “worker” set 
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out by the CJEU in the case of Lawrie-Blum with regard to the free movement of work-
ers. A reason for claiming the autonomous concept of “worker,” and extending the prin-
ciple of free movement of workers, is structured around an argument of uniform appli-
cation of EU law that shares a common aim, which is to ensure comparable protection 
for worker’s rights in the different Member States. As in the case of free movement of 
workers, the broader harmonisation of national legal orders under the idea of equal treat-
ment, of which the uniform concept of “worker” is an integral part, has gone beyond 
its sole market creation purpose and become perceived by its independent social goals.
Secondly, the EU autonomous concept of “worker” serves as a reference point to 
control a nationally-accepted definition of “worker” when implementing Directives 
whose personal scope of application is shaped by the reference to the national law of 
Member States. The argument of “effet utile” sets strict boundaries for such control by 
the CJEU, which is limited to ensuring the effectiveness of EU legislation that may be 
frustrated by the full discretion given to Member States in this regard. The power of 
the CJEU to scrutinise a nationally accepted definition of “worker,” accepted in recent 
caselaw, mitigates the risk of exclusion a certain category of workers, especially work-
ers in very atypical work relations, from protection provided in Directives, when it de-
pends on a different national definition of the concept of “worker,”
Thirdly, the argument of effective protection of all persons who provide personal 
and paid work, raises a question about the redefinition of the concept of “worker” to 
include those who are in a situation comparable to workers in the traditional sense of 
this concept, developed by the CJEU in the case of Lawrie-Blum, since having no or at 
least little bargaining power to perform fully on the market as an genuine independ-
ent contractor. The extension of the concept of “worker” to the element of “dependen-
cy” would imply a departure from the binary division established in CJEU caselaw be-
tween workers and the self-employed based on the element of “subordination.”
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